Ransomware Decryption: Decryptors, Keys and Safe Testing

Ransomware Reverse Editorial TeamLast technical review:

In short

Encrypted files can only be decrypted directly if a working decryptor or the matching key exists for the exact ransomware variant. That is far from the case for every family. Identify the variant first, test any decryptor on copies only, and pursue backup restore or professional data recovery in parallel.

The short answer: when decryption is realistic

Ransomware encrypts files with cryptographic keys the attackers control. Decrypting without paying is only possible in a few situations:

Hybrid encryption: why ransomware cannot be cracked without the private key1 File key K: random, new for every file (e.g. AES, ChaCha20) 2 Fast encryption: file is encrypted with K Public key: embedded in the ransomware (RSA or ECC) 3 Lock away K: K is encrypted with the public key and appended to the file; the original K is deleted Private key: held by the attackers only. 4 only this key opens K. When there is still hope: Bugs in the code: e.g. weak randomness or keys left in memory – the basis of many decryptors; Seized keys: law enforcement recovers private keys, tools e.g. via No More Ransom; Unencrypted regions: partial or interrupted encryption: data recovery can rebuild content. Your networkAttacker infrastructureOriginal fileReport.docx2 Fast encryptionfile is encrypted with KEncrypted fileReport.docx.lockbit1 File key Krandom, new for everyfile (e.g. AES, ChaCha20)uses KPublic keyembedded in theransomware (RSA orECC)3 Lock away KK is encrypted with the public key and appended to thefile; the original K is deletedKstoresPrivate keyheld by the attackersonly4 only this key opens KWhen there is still hopeBugs in the codee.g. weak randomness or keys left inmemory – the basis of manydecryptorsSeized keyslaw enforcement recovers privatekeys, tools e.g. via No More RansomUnencrypted regionspartial or interrupted encryption:data recovery can rebuild content © 2026 ransomware-reverse.de
Hybrid encryption: why ransomware cannot be cracked without the private key1 File key K: random, new for every file (e.g. AES, ChaCha20) 2 Fast encryption: file is encrypted with K Public key: embedded in the ransomware (RSA or ECC) 3 Lock away K: K is encrypted with the public key and appended to the file; the original K is deleted Private key: held by the attackers only. 4 only this key opens K. When there is still hope: Bugs in the code: e.g. weak randomness or keys left in memory – the basis of many decryptors; Seized keys: law enforcement recovers private keys, tools e.g. via No More Ransom; Unencrypted regions: partial or interrupted encryption: data recovery can rebuild content. Your networkOriginal fileReport.docx1 File key Krandom, new for every file (e.g. AES, ChaCha20)uses K2 Fast encryptionfile is encrypted with KEncrypted fileReport.docx.lockbitPublic keyembedded in the ransomware (RSA or ECC)3 Lock away KK is encrypted with the public key and appended tothe file; the original K is deletedAttacker infrastructurePrivate keyheld by the attackers only4 only this key opens KWhen there is still hopeBugs in the codee.g. weak randomness or keys left in memory – thebasis of many decryptorsSeized keyslaw enforcement recovers private keys, tools e.g. viaNo More RansomUnencrypted regionspartial or interrupted encryption: data recovery canrebuild content © 2026 ransomware-reverse.de
Hybrid encryption: why ransomware cannot be cracked without the private key. Every file gets its own key. Only the attackers’ private key can release it – and that key never leaves their infrastructure.
  • Flawed implementation: the ransomware uses weak cryptography, reuses keys or leaves key material on the system. Security researchers have found such flaws in some variants.[5]
  • Keys or tools from law enforcement: after investigations, keys or decryptors are sometimes released – No More Ransom, for example, lists tools from the Japanese police for Phobos/8Base and LockBit 3.0.[2]
  • Offline keys: some variants fall back to a fixed key when they cannot reach the attackers' server. Dedicated tools sometimes exist for these cases – for STOP/Djvu, for example, if the files were encrypted with a known offline key.[6]

For many current, professionally operated families, none of these apply. In that case there is simply no decryptor. That is not a matter of effort; it is a matter of mathematics.

Step 1: Identify the variant reliably

You cannot choose the right decryptor without knowing the exact variant. A tool for an older version of the same family frequently fails on newer builds.

Collect the following:

  • File extension added to encrypted files (often an ID, e-mail address or short tag)
  • Ransom note: file name, format (TXT, HTML, wallpaper) and full text
  • Attacker contact details: e-mail addresses, Tor sites, chat IDs
  • One encrypted sample file, ideally a non-sensitive document

Then compare using:

ToolPurposeNote
Ransomware databaseMatch by file extension, ransom note and familyFamily pages with decryptor status and recovery notes
ID RansomwareUpload a ransom note and/or sample fileIdentification only, no decryption[3]
No More Ransom – Crypto SheriffUpload up to two encrypted files plus details from the ransom note; checks for available decryptorsLinks directly to matching tools where they exist[8]

Step 2: Use trustworthy decryptor sources

Legitimate decryptors come from a small number of places:

  • No More Ransom: an initiative of Europol and the Dutch police with private-sector partners.[1] It collects free decryption tools from many vendors.[2]
  • Security vendors: antivirus and research teams sometimes publish tools on their own sites.
  • Authorities: after successful operations, keys or tools are occasionally released via No More Ransom or national agencies.

Some families have several tools from different vendors. Read each tool's instructions in full before running it. Many decryptors support only specific versions, file types or key variants.

Step 3: Test on copies only

A decryptor writes to files. With the wrong variant, a faulty tool or an interrupted run, files can be damaged further. So:

  1. Preserve the originals. Do not delete, format or overwrite encrypted data or affected drives.
  2. Make copies. Copy a few representative files to a separate, isolated test system.
  3. Make sure the malware is gone. No active ransomware may run on the test system. No More Ransom explicitly advises removing the malware first, otherwise files will be encrypted again.[2]
  4. Run the test and check the result. Do the files open? Are they complete? Do size and structure look right?
  5. Only then scale up. If successful, expand step by step to larger data sets, still working on copies.

If it is still unclear whether the attackers are active in the network, containment comes first. See Ransomware emergency and Incident response.

Limits of decryption

Even a matching decryptor does not solve everything:

Not every file is fully encryptedFully encrypted: Content cannot be rebuilt without the key – backup or decryptor needed. File header only: Content survives; the header can often be rebuilt. Intermittent (every n-th block): Large files such as VMDKs or databases are often partly usable. Interrupted: The unencrypted remainder can be used directly. encryptednot encryptedFully encryptedContent cannot be rebuilt without thekey – backup or decryptor neededFile header onlyContent survives; the header can oftenbe rebuiltIntermittent (every n-thblock)Large files such as VMDKs or databasesare often partly usableInterruptedThe unencrypted remainder can be useddirectly © 2026 ransomware-reverse.de
Not every file is fully encryptedFully encrypted: Content cannot be rebuilt without the key – backup or decryptor needed. File header only: Content survives; the header can often be rebuilt. Intermittent (every n-th block): Large files such as VMDKs or databases are often partly usable. Interrupted: The unencrypted remainder can be used directly. encryptednot encryptedFully encryptedContent cannot be rebuilt without the key – backup ordecryptor neededFile header onlyContent survives; the header can often be rebuiltIntermittent (every n-th block)Large files such as VMDKs or databases are often partlyusableInterruptedThe unencrypted remainder can be used directly © 2026 ransomware-reverse.de
Not every file is fully encrypted. Many ransomware families encrypt only parts of large files to save time. Which pattern applies depends on family and configuration and only shows in an analysis of disk images.
  • Partially damaged files: if encryption was interrupted or files were encrypted twice, decryption often fails for individual files.
  • Multiple variants: some incidents involve different payloads, for example one for Windows servers and one for ESXi hosts.[7]
  • Data theft remains: decryption does not undo exfiltration. With double extortion, the risk of publication persists.[4]
  • The compromise remains: backdoors, compromised accounts and persistence do not disappear because files are decrypted.[4]
  • Time: even working tools can take a long time on large data volumes.

Beware of fake decryptors and "decryption services"

A market of dubious offers has grown around ransomware:

  • Fake tools: downloads disguised as decryptors that may contain malware.
  • Opaque "decryption services": anyone promising "proprietary decryption" without disclosing the technical method may be quietly paying the attackers.
  • Guarantees: anyone who guarantees decryption without analysing the variant and the data is making a claim that is not technically sound.

Only download tools from No More Ransom or directly from established security vendors. Ask service providers specifically how recovery will be achieved technically.

Whether paying is an option at all is covered in Should you pay the ransom?. Legal questions belong with specialist counsel, your data protection officer and your insurer.

Recovery options when no decryptor exists

No decryptor does not automatically mean the data is lost. Depending on the environment, these routes may be available:

RoutePrerequisiteTypical limits
Restore from backupClean, unencrypted backup, ideally offline or immutableBackups may also be compromised; restore only into a cleaned environment
Snapshots / shadow copiesStorage- or hypervisor-level snapshots that were not deletedMany variants deliberately delete Windows shadow copies[5]
Data recovery from encrypted structuresVariant encrypts only parts of files or leaves file system metadata intactDepends on variant, file type and storage; no guarantee
Reconstruction of VM disks and databasesVMDK/VHDX or database files only partially encryptedRequires specialist tooling and copies of the original data

With large files such as virtual disks or databases, some variants encrypt only parts of the file; Akira, for example, supports a configurable encryption percentage.[7] That can open up reconstruction options. Whether this applies in a given case can only be determined by analysing the actual data.

More on this in Ransomware data recovery, Backup recovery after ransomware and Decryption vs. data recovery.

Checklist before any decryption attempt

  • Attack contained, no active encryption
  • Original data and drives preserved unchanged
  • Variant identified via extension, ransom note and sample file
  • Decryptor obtained from a trustworthy source only
  • Tool instructions read in full
  • Testing on copies on an isolated system only
  • Backup status and data recovery options checked in parallel
  • Every step documented, including for insurers and authorities

Frequently asked questions

Can ransomware be decrypted without paying the ransom?

Sometimes. It requires a publicly available decryptor or released keys for the exact variant involved, for example via the No More Ransom project. For many current families with correctly implemented cryptography, no free tool exists.

How do I find out which ransomware encrypted my files?

The key indicators are the new file extension, the name and content of the ransom note, and the attackers' contact details. Services such as ID Ransomware or No More Ransom's Crypto Sheriff compare the note and a sample file against known variants. The ransomware database on this site helps you match by file extension.

Can I run a decryptor directly on the affected server?

That is not recommended. Test every tool on copies of individual files on an isolated system first. A wrong or faulty decryptor can damage files further and reduce later recovery options.

Are there fake ransomware decryptors?

The risk exists: downloads disguised as decryption tools may themselves contain malware. Be careful, too, with providers that promise decryption without disclosing how it is achieved technically. Only download tools from No More Ransom or directly from established security vendors.

What if no decryptor exists?

Then backups, snapshots and professional data recovery become the main options. Depending on the variant and storage environment, data can sometimes be reconstructed from partially encrypted files, file system structures or virtual disks. Keep encrypted data rather than deleting it.

Does paying the ransom guarantee decryption?

No. Keys or decryptors supplied by attackers may not match or may be faulty, and there is no way to enforce the criminals' promises. Authorities and No More Ransom generally advise against paying; legal questions belong with specialist counsel and your insurer.

Related ransomware profiles

Read next

Sources and further reading

  1. [1]No More Ransom – Home and Crypto Sheriff nomoreransom.org
  2. [2]No More Ransom – Decryption Tools nomoreransom.org
  3. [3]ID Ransomware (MalwareHunterTeam) id-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com
  4. [4]BSI (German Federal Office for Information Security) – Ransomware: first aid for a serious IT security incident (German) bsi.bund.de
  5. [5]CISA – #StopRansomware Guide cisa.gov
  6. [6]Emsisoft – Decryptor for STOP Djvu emsisoft.com
  7. [7]CISA – #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware (AA24-109A) cisa.gov
  8. [8]No More Ransom – Crypto Sheriff nomoreransom.org