Decryption & Data Recovery

Ransomware Decryption or Data Recovery? The Differences Explained

Ransomware Reverse Editorial TeamLast technical review: 11 min read

Decryption requires the right key or a flaw in the ransomware, which only exists for some variants. Data recovery works independently of the key and uses whatever is still unencrypted on the storage: backups, file system remnants, partially encrypted files or database structures. In practice both paths are assessed in parallel, always on copies and never on the originals.

Key takeaways

  • Identify the variant first, for example via ID Ransomware or Crypto Sheriff, because a decryptor usually works only for specific versions of a family.
  • Test decryptors only on copies and on a clean system, because an unsuitable tool can cause additional, permanent damage to files.
  • Obtain decryptors only via No More Ransom or established security vendors – so-called universal decryptors can themselves contain malware.
  • Be sceptical of promises to decrypt any ransomware: with correctly implemented cryptography, brute force is practically hopeless.
  • Do not delete encrypted files or reinstall, because that destroys deleted originals and the options for a decryptor that may appear later.

In short: two routes to the same data

After a ransomware attack, two questions come up almost every time: Can the files be decrypted? And if not, can the data be recovered some other way?

Both routes share the same goal but work in fundamentally different ways:

  • Decryption makes the encrypted files readable again. It needs the matching key, or a flaw in the ransomware that allows the key to be reconstructed.
  • Data recovery ignores the key altogether. It searches the storage for anything that is still unencrypted: backups, snapshots, deleted original files, unencrypted parts of files or database structures.

Which route is promising depends on the ransomware variant, the storage environment and what happened to the systems after the attack. Very often the answer is a combination of both.

How ransomware encrypts: hybrid encryption

To understand why decryption fails so often, it helps to look at how the encryption works. Modern ransomware typically uses hybrid encryption, a combination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography:

Hybrid encryption: why ransomware cannot be cracked without the private key1 File key K: random, new for every file (e.g. AES, ChaCha20) 2 Fast encryption: file is encrypted with K Public key: embedded in the ransomware (RSA or ECC) 3 Lock away K: K is encrypted with the public key and appended to the file; the original K is deleted Private key: held by the attackers only. 4 only this key opens K. When there is still hope: Bugs in the code: e.g. weak randomness or keys left in memory – the basis of many decryptors; Seized keys: law enforcement recovers private keys, tools e.g. via No More Ransom; Unencrypted regions: partial or interrupted encryption: data recovery can rebuild content. Your networkAttacker infrastructureOriginal fileReport.docx2 Fast encryptionfile is encrypted with KEncrypted fileReport.docx.lockbit1 File key Krandom, new for everyfile (e.g. AES, ChaCha20)uses KPublic keyembedded in theransomware (RSA orECC)3 Lock away KK is encrypted with the public key and appended to thefile; the original K is deletedKstoresPrivate keyheld by the attackersonly4 only this key opens KWhen there is still hopeBugs in the codee.g. weak randomness or keys left inmemory – the basis of manydecryptorsSeized keyslaw enforcement recovers privatekeys, tools e.g. via No More RansomUnencrypted regionspartial or interrupted encryption:data recovery can rebuild content © 2026 ransomware-reverse.de
Hybrid encryption: why ransomware cannot be cracked without the private key1 File key K: random, new for every file (e.g. AES, ChaCha20) 2 Fast encryption: file is encrypted with K Public key: embedded in the ransomware (RSA or ECC) 3 Lock away K: K is encrypted with the public key and appended to the file; the original K is deleted Private key: held by the attackers only. 4 only this key opens K. When there is still hope: Bugs in the code: e.g. weak randomness or keys left in memory – the basis of many decryptors; Seized keys: law enforcement recovers private keys, tools e.g. via No More Ransom; Unencrypted regions: partial or interrupted encryption: data recovery can rebuild content. Your networkOriginal fileReport.docx1 File key Krandom, new for every file (e.g. AES, ChaCha20)uses K2 Fast encryptionfile is encrypted with KEncrypted fileReport.docx.lockbitPublic keyembedded in the ransomware (RSA or ECC)3 Lock away KK is encrypted with the public key and appended tothe file; the original K is deletedAttacker infrastructurePrivate keyheld by the attackers only4 only this key opens KWhen there is still hopeBugs in the codee.g. weak randomness or keys left in memory – thebasis of many decryptorsSeized keyslaw enforcement recovers private keys, tools e.g. viaNo More RansomUnencrypted regionspartial or interrupted encryption: data recovery canrebuild content © 2026 ransomware-reverse.de
Hybrid encryption: why ransomware cannot be cracked without the private key. Every file gets its own key. Only the attackers’ private key can release it – and that key never leaves their infrastructure.
  1. Symmetric layer: Each file (or file block) is encrypted with a fast symmetric cipher, typically AES or ChaCha20. The key is generated randomly, often per file.
  2. Asymmetric layer: That file key is then encrypted with the attackers' public key (for example RSA or an elliptic-curve scheme) and usually appended to the file.
  3. Private key stays with the attackers: Only the matching private key can unlock the file keys. It never touches the victim's systems.

The result: even with the encrypted file and its appended key blob in hand, the decisive piece is missing.

Why brute force is generally hopeless

"Can't someone just crack it?" is a natural question. With correctly implemented cryptography, the answer is: not in practice. The key spaces of AES-256, ChaCha20 or sufficiently long RSA keys are so large that systematically trying keys with realistic computing power will not finish in any meaningful timeframe, not even on large GPU clusters.

Successful decryption without the attackers' key therefore almost always relies on mistakes by the attackers, such as a predictable random number generator that shrinks the search space dramatically. Raw computing power alone is not enough. Be sceptical of anyone promising to decrypt "any ransomware".

When a decryptor exists

Public decryptors usually come about in one of two ways:

  • Implementation flaws: Security researchers find weaknesses in the ransomware: weak randomness, reused keys, keys left behind in memory or on disk, or cryptography applied incorrectly. CISA also notes that security researchers have found encryption flaws in some variants and released decryption or other tools.[4]
  • Keys seized by law enforcement: When authorities take down a group's infrastructure, they sometimes recover key material. A well-known example is Operation Cronos against LockBit in February 2024: with Europol's support, the Japanese Police, the UK National Crime Agency and the FBI developed decryption tools for LockBit-encrypted files, which were made available free of charge through the No More Ransom portal.[5]

Two important caveats follow:

  • A decryptor usually only covers specific versions of a family. The existence of a tool for "LockBit" does not mean every LockBit variant or build can be decrypted with it. No More Ransom therefore lists tools for specific families and versions, such as "LockBit 3.0".[1]
  • Developers fix publicly known flaws quickly. Newer versions are often no longer affected.

For tools and procedures in more detail, see Ransomware decryption.

Testing a decryptor safely

Identify the variant

First you need to know what you are dealing with. Two established, free services help:

  • ID Ransomware analyses ransom notes and sample files and maps them to a known family. It only identifies; it does not decrypt.[3]
  • Crypto Sheriff, part of the No More Ransom project, uses up to two encrypted sample files (max. 1 MB each) and details from the ransom demand to check whether a tool is available.[2]

Our ransomware database can also help you match file extensions and ransom notes.

Test on copies only

A decryptor rewrites files. If it does not match the variant exactly, or it aborts midway, files can be damaged further, in the worst case so badly that even the correct key will no longer work later. So:

  • Create a full image, or at least a copy, of the affected data before any test.
  • Start with a handful of test files and check the result properly (does the file open, is it complete?).
  • Remove the ransomware completely first, or work on a clean system. No More Ransom explicitly warns that active malware can otherwise encrypt files again.[1]

Fake decryptors are a malware risk

Under pressure, many victims search for "ransomware decryptor download". Criminals exploit exactly that: supposed universal decryptors on unknown websites, forums or video platforms can contain malware themselves. Only obtain tools from the No More Ransom portal or directly from established security vendors.

When no decryptor exists: data recovery options

If there is no matching decryptor, the data is not automatically lost. Data recovery works with whatever the ransomware did not reach or did not fully destroy.

Not every file is fully encryptedFully encrypted: Content cannot be rebuilt without the key – backup or decryptor needed. File header only: Content survives; the header can often be rebuilt. Intermittent (every n-th block): Large files such as VMDKs or databases are often partly usable. Interrupted: The unencrypted remainder can be used directly. encryptednot encryptedFully encryptedContent cannot be rebuilt without thekey – backup or decryptor neededFile header onlyContent survives; the header can oftenbe rebuiltIntermittent (every n-thblock)Large files such as VMDKs or databasesare often partly usableInterruptedThe unencrypted remainder can be useddirectly © 2026 ransomware-reverse.de
Not every file is fully encryptedFully encrypted: Content cannot be rebuilt without the key – backup or decryptor needed. File header only: Content survives; the header can often be rebuilt. Intermittent (every n-th block): Large files such as VMDKs or databases are often partly usable. Interrupted: The unencrypted remainder can be used directly. encryptednot encryptedFully encryptedContent cannot be rebuilt without the key – backup ordecryptor neededFile header onlyContent survives; the header can often be rebuiltIntermittent (every n-th block)Large files such as VMDKs or databases are often partlyusableInterruptedThe unencrypted remainder can be used directly © 2026 ransomware-reverse.de
Not every file is fully encrypted. Many ransomware families encrypt only parts of large files to save time. Which pattern applies depends on family and configuration and only shows in an analysis of disk images.

Restoring from backup

The fastest route is a clean backup. In practice this is far from trivial: many ransomware variants actively look for accessible backups to delete or encrypt them, and attackers also tamper with repositories or retention policies.[4] You also need to establish whether the backup predates the initial intrusion. More in Ransomware backup recovery.

Partial and intermittent encryption

A number of ransomware families do not encrypt files completely. To work faster and evade detection, they encrypt only parts of each file: the first few megabytes, blocks at fixed intervals, or sections determined by file size. In 2022 SentinelLabs documented this intermittent encryption across several families, including BlackCat (ALPHV), Play, Agenda and Black Basta.[6]

This matters for recovery: in large files such as virtual disks (VMDK, VHDX), database files or archives, a substantial share of the payload often remains unencrypted. With specialist knowledge, those regions can be read and partially reassembled into usable structures. How well that works depends heavily on the encryption pattern and the file format.

File system recovery

Depending on the variant, the ransomware writes an encrypted copy and then deletes the original, or overwrites files in place and renames them. If the original was only deleted and not overwritten, its data is still on the drive. Using file system structures (such as the NTFS MFT, ext4 inodes, or ZFS and Btrfs metadata), such files can often be restored with their names and folder structure.

The prerequisite: the affected areas must not be written to after the attack. Every reinstall, restore onto the same drive or continued production use reduces the chances.

Raw recovery and carving

If the file system structures are destroyed, what remains is raw recovery, also called file carving: the drive is scanned sector by sector for known file signatures (headers, footers, internal structures). Files can be found this way even without directory information.

The limits: file names, folder structure and timestamps are often lost, and fragmented files cannot always be fully reassembled. Carving is usually the last resort, but for individual critical documents it can make the difference.

Shadow copies and snapshots

Windows Volume Shadow Copies would be an obvious lifeline, which is exactly why many variants delete them deliberately, for example with vssadmin delete shadows or wmic shadowcopy delete.[7] Checking is still worthwhile, ideally on an image, because occasionally remnants survive or the deletion fails.

The same applies to snapshots on NAS systems, SAN storage or hypervisors. If they were configured as immutable or sat outside the attackers' reach, they are often the quickest way back. More in Ransomware on servers, NAS, RAID and VMware.

Database recovery

Databases (for example Microsoft SQL Server, Oracle, MySQL/MariaDB, PostgreSQL, Exchange databases) are often very large files and therefore prime candidates for partial encryption. Even when the file header is encrypted, intact data pages often sit behind it. With knowledge of the internal page format, they can be extracted and rebuilt into a new, consistent database. Transaction logs or older database files left on the storage can help too.

Database recovery is technically demanding and close to the application: the goal is not just "some data" but a database the application will accept again.

Comparison: decryption, backup and data recovery

MethodPrerequisiteAdvantageLimitation
Decryptor (public)Matching key or exploitable flaw for this exact variantOriginal files with names and structure; no storage expertise requiredNot available for many current variants; the wrong tool can damage files
Backup restoreClean, complete backup from before the intrusionFast, predictable, complete data setBackup may be deleted, encrypted or already compromised; data loss since last backup[4]
Snapshots / shadow copiesSnapshots not deleted or configured as immutableVery fast, often entire volumesShadow copies are deliberately deleted by many variants[7]
Reading partially encrypted filesRansomware only encrypts parts of files (intermittent)Independent of the key; large amounts of data often usableDepends on pattern and file format; headers and metadata often destroyed[6]
File system recoveryDeleted originals still present, usable file system structuresIndependent of the key; often with file names and foldersDepends on the damage; overwriting after the attack reduces chances
Raw recovery / carvingFile content sits unencrypted in unallocated spaceLast resort even without a file systemFile names, folders and timestamps may be lost; fragmentation
Database recoveryRecoverable data pages or logsApplication-level result, usable databaseTechnically complex, time-consuming, not always complete
Paying the ransomAttackers deliver a working keyFull decryption in theoryNo guarantee, legal and ethical risks, attacker decryptors can be faulty

More on the last row: Should you pay the ransom?

Decision tree: which route, in which order?

The steps below are guidance, not a rigid scheme. Depending on the environment, several steps run in parallel.

Decision path after a ransomware attack1. Is the attack still running or the attack path unknown? Yes: Incident response – Contain the attack, preserve evidence – Cybernotfall24. No: continue. 2. Is there a clean, verified backup? Yes: Recover in a controlled way – Check the backup in isolation, restore only after IR sign-off. No: continue. 3. Is a reputable decryptor known for the variant? Yes: Test the decryptor on copies – Check the source, e.g. No More Ransom. No: continue. Data recovery: Assess recoverability of drives, RAID/NAS and VMs – DATA REVERSE. After containment continue with question 2. 1Is the attack still running or the attack pathunknown?Incident responseContain the attack, preserve evidence –Cybernotfall24YesNo2Is there a clean, verified backup?Recover in a controlled wayCheck the backup in isolation, restore only after IRsign-offYesNo3Is a reputable decryptor known for thevariant?Test the decryptor on copiesCheck the source, e.g. No More RansomYesNoData recoveryAssess recoverability of drives, RAID/NAS and VMs– DATA REVERSEAfter containment continuewith question 2 © 2026 ransomware-reverse.de
Decision path after a ransomware attack1. Is the attack still running or the attack path unknown? Yes: Incident response – Contain the attack, preserve evidence – Cybernotfall24. No: continue. 2. Is there a clean, verified backup? Yes: Recover in a controlled way – Check the backup in isolation, restore only after IR sign-off. No: continue. 3. Is a reputable decryptor known for the variant? Yes: Test the decryptor on copies – Check the source, e.g. No More Ransom. No: continue. Data recovery: Assess recoverability of drives, RAID/NAS and VMs – DATA REVERSE. After containment continue with question 2. 1. Is the attack still running or the attack pathunknown?YesIncident responseContain the attack, preserve evidence –Cybernotfall24No2. Is there a clean, verified backup?YesRecover in a controlled wayCheck the backup in isolation, restore onlyafter IR sign-offNo3. Is a reputable decryptor known for thevariant?YesTest the decryptor on copiesCheck the source, e.g. No More RansomNoData recoveryAssess recoverability of drives, RAID/NAS and VMs –DATA REVERSE © 2026 ransomware-reverse.de
Decision path after a ransomware attack. Contain first, then recover. Data recovery comes in when neither a clean backup nor a decryptor works.
  1. Is the attack contained? If not, or if unclear: incident response first. Without containment, systems can be encrypted again, including data you have already restored.
  2. Secure the affected drives. No reinstalls, no formatting, no restores onto the same drives. Create images wherever possible. Do not trigger rebuilds or re-initialisation on RAID, NAS or SAN systems.
  3. Identify the variant. Check the ransom note, file extension and sample files with ID Ransomware or Crypto Sheriff, and document the result.
  4. Is there a reputable decryptor? If yes: test on copies, verify the result, then apply it to further data. If no: continue with step 5.
  5. Check backups and snapshots. Do they exist, are they untouched, and do they predate the initial intrusion? If yes: plan the restore into a cleaned environment.
  6. Identify the gaps. Which data is still missing after decryptor and backup? Which systems are business-critical (ERP, databases, file servers, VMs)?
  7. Have the gaps assessed for data recovery. Analyse partial encryption, file system recovery, carving and database recovery on the secured images.
  8. Validate the recovery. Open samples, check databases for consistency, test applications, and document the results for your insurer and, where required, the authorities.

Who does what? Keeping incident response and data recovery apart

The two routes are backed by different disciplines:

  • Incident response (for example via our partner Cybernotfall24, see Incident response) deals with the attack itself: containment, forensics, the attack path, compromised credentials, lateral movement, possible data exfiltration and recovery planning.
  • Data recovery (for example via our partner DATA REVERSE, see Ransomware data recovery) deals with the data: encrypted or damaged drives, RAID/NAS/SAN, virtual disks, file systems and databases.

Decryption testing sits in between: it requires a clean environment and works on secured data. Clarify early who takes on which role, so that images, evidence and recovery work do not get in each other's way.

Which route fits your situation?

Common mistakes that cost you options

  • Reinstalling straight away: destroys deleted originals and file system remnants.
  • Running unknown decryptors directly on the originals: can damage files beyond repair or introduce new malware.
  • RAID rebuilds or NAS re-initialisation after the attack: overwrites metadata and makes any reconstruction harder.
  • Restoring backups without checking them: can bring the attackers' persistence back or write onto the same encrypted storage.
  • Deleting encrypted files because they are "lost anyway": you will need them if a decryptor is released or keys are seized later.

Conclusion

Decryption and data recovery are not competitors. A decryptor is the cleanest route, but it only exists for some variants and depends on attacker mistakes or law enforcement success. Data recovery is independent of the key and uses everything that is still unencrypted, within limits set by the damage and by what happened after the attack. Secure the drives early, test on copies and assess both routes in parallel, and you keep the most options open.

Frequently asked questions

Can ransomware be decrypted without paying the ransom?

Sometimes. It is possible when a decryptor exists for the specific variant, for example because the ransomware was implemented with flaws or because law enforcement seized keys. For many current variants no public decryptor exists. Backups and data recovery then remain the main options.

Can the encryption be cracked by brute force?

Not in practice, if modern cryptography is implemented correctly. The key spaces of common algorithms such as AES-256 or ChaCha20 are so large that trying every key with realistic computing power is hopeless. Successful decryption without the attackers' key almost always relies on implementation mistakes rather than raw computing power.

How do I find out which ransomware encrypted my files?

Services such as ID Ransomware or the No More Ransom Crypto Sheriff analyse ransom notes and sample files and indicate whether a known decryptor exists. Avoid uploading files with sensitive content where possible, and document the result for your incident response provider and insurer.

Are free decryptors from the internet safe?

Only from reputable sources such as the No More Ransom portal or directly from established security vendors. So-called universal decryptors on unknown websites, in forums or sent by email are a well-known malware risk. Even reputable tools should only be tested on copies of the encrypted data.

Can encrypted files be recovered without the key?

Partly. A file that has been fully and correctly encrypted cannot be read without the key. Often, however, unencrypted data still exists: deleted originals, partially encrypted files, shadow copies, snapshots or database pages. These remnants are where data recovery starts.

Do Windows shadow copies help after a ransomware attack?

Rarely, but it is worth checking. Many ransomware variants deliberately delete Volume Shadow Copies before or during encryption. Whether shadow copies or traces of them still exist should be checked on a disk image, not on the live system.

What comes first: looking for a decryptor or requesting data recovery?

Both can run in parallel. The prerequisite is that the attack has been contained and the affected drives have been secured or imaged. Only then should decryptors be tested or recovery techniques applied, in each case on copies.

Why shouldn't I reformat or reinstall encrypted drives?

Because every reinstall, format or restore onto the same drive can overwrite areas that still hold unencrypted data remnants. That permanently removes options for file system recovery, carving and database recovery.

Related ransomware profiles

Read next

Sources and further reading

  1. [1]No More Ransom – Decryption Tools nomoreransom.org
  2. [2]No More Ransom – Crypto Sheriff nomoreransom.org
  3. [3]ID Ransomware (MalwareHunterTeam) id-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com
  4. [4]CISA – #StopRansomware Guide cisa.gov
  5. [5]Europol – Law enforcement disrupt world's biggest ransomware operation (Operation Cronos, LockBit) europol.europa.eu
  6. [6]SentinelLabs – Ransomware Developers Turn to Intermittent Encryption to Evade Detection sentinelone.com
  7. [7]MITRE ATT&CK – T1490 Inhibit System Recovery attack.mitre.org